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    <title>Capability Host Protocol — Blog</title>
    <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog</link>
    <description>On governing and proving what AI agents and systems do.</description>
    <item>
      <title>The agentic web has no evidence layer</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-agentic-web-has-no-evidence-layer</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-agentic-web-has-no-evidence-layer</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>We're building careful ways for agents to discover tools, call them, and prove who they are. We've built almost nothing to prove what they actually did. That missing layer is where trust between agents will either hold or break.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Introducing capabilities.txt: a discovery standard for the agentic web</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/introducing-capabilities-txt</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/introducing-capabilities-txt</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 22 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Agents can find what to read (llms.txt) and respect what to crawl (robots.txt). There's no standard way for a host to advertise what it can do. capabilities.txt is that missing layer.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Logs aren't evidence</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/logs-arent-evidence</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/logs-arent-evidence</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>When an AI agent does something consequential and someone asks what happened, scattered application logs aren't an answer. Here's the difference between a log and evidence — and why it's a protocol problem.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why a protocol, not a feature</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/why-a-protocol-not-a-feature</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/why-a-protocol-not-a-feature</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Every agent framework will add its own audit log. So why does governing AI actions need an open protocol? Because evidence you can trust has to outlive the system that produced it.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Proving why a claim was denied</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/proving-why-a-claim-was-denied</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/proving-why-a-claim-was-denied</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Insurers are automating approve/deny decisions faster than they can defend them. Denial is a first-class outcome in CHP — which makes 'show me why' a recorded fact, not a reconstruction.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The capability boundary: where AI governance actually happens</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-capability-boundary</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-capability-boundary</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>You can't govern an AI agent by watching the model. Governance happens at the capability boundary — the moment an action crosses from intent into effect. Here's why that line is the right place to stand.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chain of custody for AI-assisted review</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/chain-of-custody-for-ai-review</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/chain-of-custody-for-ai-review</guid>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>When AI reads, summarizes, and flags documents in legal review, the work product is only as defensible as its provenance. CHP's evidence is hash-chained — which is, almost literally, chain of custody.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The security review that stalls your agent</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-security-review-that-stalls-your-agent</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/the-security-review-that-stalls-your-agent</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>You built the agent. It works. Then a security review asks what it did and whether it was allowed to — and the rollout stops. That gap is where CHP starts, and it's real today.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Controls in the contract, not the code review</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/controls-in-the-contract</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/controls-in-the-contract</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>When AI sits inside trading, credit, and payments decisions, 'demonstrate the controls' is the question that arrives from model risk and regulators. CHP puts the controls in the capability contract — enforced before invocation, not asserted after.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who authorized the AI step?</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/who-authorized-the-ai-step</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/who-authorized-the-ai-step</guid>
      <pubDate>Sat, 16 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>AI scribes and agents draft notes, summarize charts, and prepare orders — but a clinician stays in command. CHP records the sign-off as a governed approval in the same trace, capturing who-did-what without storing the PHI body.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who commanded the machine?</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/who-commanded-the-machine</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/who-commanded-the-machine</guid>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>Work orders, dispatches, and machine commands are increasingly issued by software and agents, not just people. When something goes wrong, the question is who commanded it, whether it was approved, and whether a safety condition was checked.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CHP and MCP: discovery, invocation, and evidence</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/chp-and-mcp</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/chp-and-mcp</guid>
      <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>The Model Context Protocol answers 'what can the model call.' CHP answers 'what actually happened, and can I prove it.' They're different layers of the same stack — here's how they fit.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Evidence is not telemetry</title>
      <link>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/evidence-is-not-telemetry</link>
      <guid>https://capabilityhostprotocol.com/blog/evidence-is-not-telemetry</guid>
      <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <description>You already run OpenTelemetry. So why would agent actions need a separate evidence layer? Because telemetry is built to help you understand a system — and evidence is built to be defended. Different jobs, and they compose.</description>
    </item>
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